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Abstract—Wireless networks are vulnerable to Sybil attacks, in which a malicious node poses as many identities in order to gain
disproportionate influence. Many defenses based on spatial variability of wireless channels exist, but depend either on detailed, multi-tap
channel estimation—something not exposed on commodity 802.11 devices—or valid RSSI observations from multiple trusted sources,
e.g., corporate access points—something not directly available in ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks with potentially malicious neighbors.
We extend these techniques to be practical for wireless ad hoc networks of commodity 802.11 devices. Specifically, we propose two
efficient methods for separating the valid RSSI observations of behaving nodes from those falsified by malicious participants. Further, we
note that prior signalprint methods are easily defeated by mobile attackers and develop an appropriate challenge-response defense.
Finally, we present the Mason test, the first implementation of these techniques for ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks of commodity
802.11 devices. We illustrate its performance in several real-world scenarios.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
THE open nature of wireless ad hoc networks (includ-ing delay-tolerant networks [1]) enables applications
ranging from collaborative environmental sensing [2] to
emergency communication [3], but introduces numerous
security concerns since participants are not vetted. So-
lutions generally rely on a majority of the participants
following a particular protocol, an assumption that often
holds because physical nodes are expensive. However,
this assumption is easily broken by a Sybil attack. A single
physical entity can pretend to be multiple participants,
gaining unfair influence at low cost [4]. Newsome et
al. survey Sybil attacks against various protocols [5],
illustrating the need for a practical defense.
Proposed defenses (see Levine et al. for a survey [6])
fall into two categories. Trusted certification methods [7],
[8] use a central authority to vet potential participants
and thus are not useful in open ad hoc (and delay-
tolerant) networks. Resource testing methods [9], [10],
[11], [12] verify the resources (e.g., computing capability,
storage capacity, real-world social relationships, etc.) of
each physical entity. Most are easily defeated in ad hoc
networks of resource-limited mobile devices by attackers
with access to greater resources, e.g., workstations or data
centers.
One useful class of defenses is based on the natural
spatial variation in the wireless propagation channel,
• Y. Liu, D. R. Bild, R. P. Dick, and Z. M. Mao are with the Department of
Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109.
E-mail: {liuyue,drbild,dickrp,zmao}@umich.edu
• D. S. Wallach is with the Department of Computer Science, Rice University,
Houston, TX 77005.
E-mail: dwallach@cs.rice.edu
This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under award
TC-0964545.
an implicit resource. Channel responses are uncorre-
lated over distances greater than half the transmission
wavelength [13] (6.25 cm for 2.4GHz 802.11), so two
transmissions with the same channel response are likely
from the same location and device [14], [15]. However, the
existing Sybil defenses based on this observation are not
directly usable in open ad hoc networks of commodity
devices.
Xiao et al. observe that in OFDM-based 802.11 the
coherence bandwidth is much smaller than the system
bandwidth and thus the channel response estimates at
well-spaced frequency taps are uncorrelated, forming a
vector unique to the transmitter location and robust to
changes in transmitter power [15]. Unfortunately com-
modity 802.11 devices do not expose these estimates to
the driver and operating system, restricting this technique
to specialized hardware and access points.
Commodity devices do expose an aggregate, scalar
value, the received signal strength. RSSI is not robust to
changes in transmitter power, so a vector of observations
from multiple receivers—a signalprint—is used instead.
Several authors have proposed such methods [15], [16],
[17], [18], [19], [20], [21] assuming trusted, true obser-
vations. In open ad hoc networks, observations are
untrusted, coming from potentially-lying neighbors, as
illustrated in Figure 1. Trust-less methods have been
proposed, but have various limitations (e.g., devices must
be non-mobile [22], colluding attackers can defeat the
scheme [23], or are limited to outdoor environments with
predictable propagation ranges [24]). Instead, a general
method to separate true and false observations is needed.
We observe that with high probability attackers can-
not produce false observations that make conforming
identities look Sybil, due to the unpredictability of the
wireless channels. We exploit this weakness to bound
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(a) RSSI observations from trusted
APs identity the Sybils, S1 and S2,
from attacker M .
I
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(b) In ad hoc networks, the partici-
pants themselves act as observers,
but can maliciously report falsified
values.
A
I
B
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(c) If I believes the falsified ob-
servations from S1 and S2, it will
incorrectly accept them and reject
A and B as Sybil.
Fig. 1. Prior work [15], [16] assumes trusted RSSI observations, not generally available in ad hoc and delay-tolerant
networks. We present a technique for a participant to separate true and false observations, enabling use in ad hoc
networks. (Arrows point from transmitter to observer.)
the number of misclassified identities. In cases when
conforming nodes outnumber physical attacking nodes
(a major motivating factor for the Sybil attack), we
develop a notion of consistency that enables fully-accurate
classification.
Most past work assumes nodes are stationary, as mov-
ing attacks can easily defeat signalprint-based detection.
As noted, but not pursued, by Xiao et al., successive
transmissions from the same node should have the same
signalprint and attackers likely cannot quickly (i.e., in
milliseconds) switch between precise positions [15]. We
develop a challenge–response protocol from this idea and
study its performance on real deployments.
We make the following primary contributions.
• We design two methods of O(n3) complexity to
separate true and false RSSI observations, enabling
signalprint-based Sybil detection in ad hoc networks
of mutually distrusting nodes. The first method
gives partial separation, bounding the number of
misclassified identities. The second provides full
separation, but works only when conforming nodes
outnumber the physical attacking nodes.
• We prove conditions under which a participant can
fully separate true and false observations.
• We develop a challenge-response protocol to detect
attackers attempting to use motion to defeat the
signalprint-based Sybil defense.
• We describe the Mason test, a practical protocol for
Sybil defense based on these ideas. We implemented
the Mason test as a Linux kernel module for 802.11
ad hoc networks1 and characterize its performance
in real-world scenarios.
1. http://github.com/EmbeddedAtUM/mason/
2 PROBLEM FORMULATION AND
BACKGROUND
In this section, we define our problem, summarize the
solution framework, describe our attack model, and
briefly review the signalprint method.
2.1 Problem Formulation
Our high-level goal is to allow a wireless network
participant to occasionally determine which of its one-
hop neighbors are non-Sybil. These identities may safely
participate in other protocols. In mobile networks, the
process must be repeated occasionally (e.g., once per hour)
as the topology changes. Safety is more important than
system performance, so nearly all Sybil identities should
be identified, but some non-Sybils may be rejected.
Prior work showed the effectiveness of signalprint
techniques with trusted RSSI observers. We extend those
methods to work without a priori trust in any observers.
As illustrated in Figure 2, we assume an arbitrary identity
(or condition) starts the process. Participants take turns
broadcasting a probe packet while all others record the
observed RSSIs. These observations are then shared,
although malicious nodes may lie. Finally each partici-
pant individually selects a (hopefully truthful) subset of
observers for signalprint-based Sybil classification.
This paper presents our method for truthful subset
selection and fleshes out this framework into a usable,
safe, and secure protocol. As with any system intended
for real-world use, we had to carefully balance system
complexity and potential security weaknesses. Section 9
discusses these choices and related potential concerns.
2.2 Attack Model
We assume attackers have the following capabilities and
restrictions.
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(a) Nodes record their observed
RSSIs of probes broadcast by
neighbors. A and B have sent; C,
D, and E are next.
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(b) RSSI observations are shared
among all participants. Malicious
nodes may lie about their observa-
tions.
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(c) Each participant selects a subset
of the observations to form signal-
prints for Sybil detection.
Fig. 2. The solution framework for signalprint-based Sybil detection in ad hoc networks. This paper fleshes out this
concept into a safe and secure protocol, the Mason test.
1) Attackers may collude through arbitrary side chan-
nels.
2) Attackers may accumulate information, e.g., RSSIs,
across multiple rounds of the Mason test.
3) Attackers have limited ability to predict RSSI
observations of other nodes, e.g., 7dBm uncer-
tainty (see Section 5), precluding fine-grained pre-
characterization.
4) Attackers can control transmit power for each
packet, but not precisely or quickly steer the output
in a desired direction, e.g., beam-forming.
5) Attackers cannot quickly and precisely switch be-
tween multiple positions, e.g., they do not have
high-speed, automated electromechanical control.
These capabilities and restrictions model attacking nodes
that are commodity devices, a cheaper attack vector than
distributing specialized hardware. These devices could
be obtained by compromising those owned by normal
network participants or directly deployed by the attacker.
One common denial-of-service (DOS) attack in wireless
networks—jamming the channel—cannot be defended
against by commodity devices. Thus, we do not defend
against other more-complicated DOS attacks. However,
note that ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks are much
more resistant than infrastructured networks to such
attacks, because a single attack can affect only a small
portion of the network.
Notably, we assume attackers do not have per-
antenna control of MIMO (Multiple-Input and Multiple-
Output) [25] devices. Such control would defeat the
signalprint method (even with trusted observers), but is
not a feasible attack. Commodity MIMO devices (e.g.,
802.11n adapters) do not expose this control to software
and thus are not suitable attack vectors. Distributing
specialized MIMO-capable hardware over large portions
of the network would be prohibitively expensive.
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Fig. 3. Sybils,A–B andD–
E, occupy nearby slope-1
lines.
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Fig. 4. The distance
threshold trades false posi-
tives for negatives.
We believe that the signalprint method can be extended
to MIMO systems (see our technical report for an
overview [26]), but doing so is beyond the scope of this
work. Our focus is extending signalprint-based methods
to ad hoc networks of commodity devices by removing
the requirement for trusted observations.
2.3 Review of Signalprints
We briefly review the signalprint method. See prior work
for details [15], [17]. A signalprint is a vector of RSSIs
at multiple observers for a single transmission. Ignoring
noise, the vector of received powers (in logarithmic units,
e.g., dBm) at multiple receivers for a given transmission
can be modeled [13] as ~s = ~h + p~1, where p is the
transmit power and ~h is the attenuation vector, a function
of the channel amplitude response and the receiver
characteristics. Transmissions from different locations
have uncorrelated signalprints, as the channel responses
are likely uncorrelated. Those from the same location,
however, share a channel response and will be correlated.
That is, for two transmissions a and b from the same
location with transmit powers pa and pb = pa + c, the
4signalprints ~sb = ~h + pa~1 and ~sb = ~h + (pa + c)~1 are
related as ~sb = ~sa + c~1. In other words, all observers see
the same RSSI difference c for the two transmissions.
This is illustrated geometrically in Figure 3 for a two-
receiver signalprint. A and B are Sybil, while C is not. D
and E are also Sybil, but due to noise the signalprints are
not perfectly correlated. Instead, signalprints occupying
lines closer than some threshold are taken to be Sybil.
Definition. The signalprint distance d(~sa,~sb) between two
signalprints ~sa and ~sb is the perpendicular distance
between the slope-1 lines containing them. Letting
~w , ~sa −~sb
be the distance vector between the signalprints and
~v⊥ , ~w − ~w ·
~1
‖~1‖2
~1
be the vector rejection of ~w from ~1, then
d(~sa,~sb) = ‖~v⊥‖.
As shown in Figure 4, the distance distributions for
Sybil and non-Sybil identities overlap, so the threshold
choice trades false positives for negatives. A good thresh-
old can detect at least 99.9% of Sybils while accepting at
least 95% of non-Sybils [15], [17].
3 SYBIL CLASSIFICATION FROM UNTRUSTED
SIGNALPRINTS
In this section we describe two methods to detect Sybil
identities using untrusted RSSI observations. In both
cases, a set of candidate views containing the true view
(with high probability) is generated. The accepted view
is chosen by a view selection policy. The first method’s
policy selects the view indicting the most Sybils, limiting
the total number of incorrect classifications. The second
selects the true view, but works only when conforming
nodes outnumber physical attacker nodes.
3.1 The Limited Power of Falsified Observations
Our key observation is that falsified RSSI observations
have limited power. Although falsifying observations
to make Sybil identities look non-Sybil is easy, it is
extremely difficult to make a non-Sybil look Sybil. To
see this, recall that two identities are considered Sybil
only if all observers report the same RSSI difference
for their transmissions. For any pair of identities, the
initiator observes a RSSI difference itself. On one hand,
making true Sybils appear non-Sybil is easy, because
randomly chosen values almost certainly fail to match
this difference. Making a non-Sybil look Sybil, however,
requires learning the difference observed by the initiator
itself, which is kept secret. Guessing is impractical due
to the unpredictability of the wireless channels. Our
methods rely on this difficulty, which is quantified in
Section 5.
3.2 Terminology
I is the set of participating identities. Each is either
Sybil or non-Sybil and reports either true or false2 RSSI
observations, partitioning the identities by their Sybilness
(sets S and NS ) and the veracity of their reported
observations (sets T and L).
LS LNS
TS C
S NS
L
T
Truthtelling, non-Sybil identities are called conforming (set
C). Liars and Sybil identities are called attacking (sets LS ,
LNS , and TS ). Our goal is to distinguish the S and NS
partitions using the reported RSSI observations without
knowing a priori the L and T partitions.
Definition. An initiator is the node performing Sybil
classification.3 It trusts its own RSSI observations, but no
others.
Definition. A receiver set, denoted by R, is a subset of
identities (R ⊆ I) whose reported RSSI observations, with
the initiator’s, form signalprints. Those with liars (R∩L 6=
∅) produce incorrect classifications and those with only
truthtellers (R ⊆ T ) produce the correct classification.
Definition. A view, denoted by V , is a classification of
identities as Sybil and non-Sybil. Those classified as Sybil
(non-Sybil) are said to be Sybil (non-Sybil) under V and
are denoted by the subset VS (VNS). A view V obtained
from the signalprints of a receiver set R is generated by
R, denoted by R 7→ V (read: R generates V ), and can be
written V (R). Identities in R are considered non-Sybil, i.e.,
R ⊆ VNS(R). A true view, denoted by V , correctly labels
all identities, i.e., V S = S and V NS = NS . Similarly, a false
view, denoted by V̂ , incorrectly labels some identities, i.e.,
V̂S 6= S and V̂NS 6= NS .
Definition. Incorrectly labeling non-Sybil identities as
Sybil is called collapsing.
Assumption. To clearly illustrate the impact of
intentionally-falsified observations, we first assume that
true RSSI observations are noise-free and thus always
generate the true view. In Section 3.7, we extend the
method to handle real-world observations containing, for
example, random noise and discretization error.
3.3 Approach Overview
A general separation method does not exist, because
different scenarios can lead to the same reported RSSI
2. A reported RSSI observation is considered false if signalprints
containing it misclassify some identities.
3. All participants perform classification individually, so each is the
initiator in its own classification session.
5TABLE 1
Definitions of Terms and Symbols
Definition Notes
Sets of Identities
I all participating identities
NS all non-Sybil identities
I = {NS |S}
S all Sybil identities
T all truthful identities
I = {T |L}
L all lying identities
C all conforming, or truthful, non-Sybil, identities NS = {C|LNS}
LNS all lying, non-Sybil identities S = {TS |LS}
TS all truthful, Sybil identities T = {C|TS}
LS all lying, Sybil identities L = {LNS |LS}
VNS all identities labeled non-Sybil by view V I = {VNS|VS}VS all identities labeled Sybil by view V
R (receiver set) identities used to form signalprints
Views
V (view) a Sybil–non-Sybil labeling of I
V (true view) a view that correctly labels all identities V NS = NS and V S = S
V̂ (false view) a view that incorrectly labels some identities V̂NS 6= NS and V̂S 6= S
V (R) the view generated by receiver set R
Terms
generates (R 7→ V ) a receiver set generates a view
initiator node performing the Sybil classification
collapse classify a non-Sybil identity as Sybil
observations. To illustrate, consider identities I = {A|B}
reporting observations such that
R ⊆ A 7→ V 1 = {V 1NS = A|V 1S = B} and
R ⊆ B 7→ V 2 = {V 2NS = B|V 2S = A}
and two different scenarios x and y such that
in x, {T x = A|Lx = B} = I and
in y, {T y = B|Ly = A} = I.
R ⊆ T 7→ V , so V 1 and V 2 are both true views, the former
in scenario x and the latter in scenario y. Consequently,
no method can always choose the correct view.
We instead develop two different approaches. The
first method, the maximum Sybil policy, simply bounds
the number of misclassified identities by selecting the
view reporting the most Sybils. This selected view must
indite at least as many as the true view, bounding the
accepted Sybils by the number of collapsed conforming
identities. Collapsing is difficult, limiting the incorrect
classifications.
The second method, the view consistency policy, allows
complete separation, but requires that the following
conditions be met.
• All view correctly classify some conforming identi-
ties, because collapsing identities is difficult.
• Conforming identities outnumber lying, non-Sybils
(a major motivating factor for the Sybil attack).
This approach follows from the idea that true observa-
tions are trivially self-consistent, while lies often contra-
dict themselves. We develop a notion of consistency that
allows separation of true and false observations.
3.4 Maximum Sybil Policy: Select the View Claiming
the Most Sybil Identities
In this section, we prove that the maximum Sybil policy—
selecting the view claiming the most Sybil identities—
produces a classification with bounded error. The number
of incorrectly-accepted Sybil identities is bounded by the
number of collapsed conforming identities.
Lemma 1. The selected view V claims at least as many Sybil
identities as actually exist, i.e., |VS| ≥ |S|.
Proof: Since the true view V claiming |S| Sybils
always exists, the selected view can claim no less.
Theorem 1. The selected view V misclassifies no more Sybil
identities than it collapses conforming identities, i.e., |VNS ∩
S| ≤ |VS ∩NS |.
Proof: Intuitively, claiming the minimum |S| Sybil
identities requires that each misclassified Sybil be com-
pensated for by a collapsed non-Sybil identity. Formally,
combining |VS ∪ VNS| = |S ∪ NS | with Lemma 1 yields
|(VS∪VNS)∩S| ≤ |(S ∪NS )∩VS|. Removing the common
VS ∩ S from both sides gives |VNS ∩ S| ≤ |VS ∩NS |.
Theorem 1 bounds the misclassifications by the at-
tacker’s collapsing power, |VS ∩NS |. Although |VS ∩NS |
is small (see Section 5), one Sybil is still accepted for each
conforming identity collapsed. The next few sections de-
velop a second method that allows accurate classification,
but only when conforming nodes outnumber attackers.
3.5 View Consistency Policy: Selecting V if LNS = ∅
Our view consistency policy stems from the intuition
that lies often contradict themselves. It is introduced here
6using the following unrealistic assumption, which we
remove in Section 3.6.
Restriction 1. All liars are Sybil, i.e., LNS = ∅, and thus
all non-Sybil identities are truthful, i.e., NS ⊆ T .
Restriction 1 endows the true view with a useful
property: all receiver sets comprising the non-Sybil
identities under the true view will generate the true view.
We formalize this consistency as follows.
Definition. A view is view-consistent if and only if
all receiver sets comprising a subset of the non-Sybil
identities under that view generate the same view, i.e.,
V is view-consistent iff ∀R ∈ 2VNS : R 7→ V .
Lemma 2. Under Restriction 1, the true view is view-
consistent, i.e., ∀R ∈ 2V NS : R 7→ V .
Proof: Consider the true view V . By definition, V NS =
NS. By Restriction 1, NS ⊆ T and thus, V NS ⊆ T . ∀R ∈
2T 7→ V , so ∀R ∈ 2V NS : R 7→ V .
Were all false views not consistent, then consistency
could be used to identify the true view. A fully omniscient
attacker could theoretically generate a false, consistent
view by collapsing all conforming identities. However,
the practical difficulty of collapsing identities prevents
this. We formalize this as follows.
Condition 1. All receiver sets correctly classify at least
one conforming identity, i.e., ∀R ∈ 2I : VNS(R) ∩ C 6= ∅.
Justification: Collapsing conforming identities re-
quires knowing the hard-to-predict initiator’s RSSI ob-
servations. Section 5 quantifies the probability that our
required conditions hold.
Lemma 3. Under Condition 1, a view generated by a receiver
set containing a liar is not view-consistent, i.e., R ∩ L 6= ∅
implies V (R) is not view-consistent.
Proof: Consider such a receiver set R with R∩L 6= ∅.
By Condition 1, r , VNS(R) ∩ C is not empty and since
r ⊆ C ⊆ T , r 7→ V . By the definition of a liar, V (R) 6= V
and thus R is not consistent.
Theorem 2. Under Restriction 1 and Condition 1 and
assuming C 6= ∅, exactly one consistent view is generated
across all receiver sets and that view is the true view.
Proof: By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3, only the true view
is consistent, so we need only show that at least one
receiver set generates the true view. C 6= ∅ and thus
R = C 7→ V .
This result suggests a method to identify the true view—
select the only consistent view. Restriction 1 does not hold
in practice, so we develop methods to relax it.
3.6 Achieving Consistency by Eliminating LNS
Consider a scenario with some non-Sybil liars. The
true view would be consistent were the non-Sybil liars
excluded. Similarly, a false view could be consistent were
the correctly classified conforming identities excluded.
If the latter outnumber the former, this yields a useful
property: the consistent view for the largest subset of
identities, i.e., that with the fewest excluded, is the true
view, as we now formalize and prove.
Condition 2. The number of conforming identities is
strictly greater than the number of non-Sybil liars, i.e.,
|C| > |LNS |.
Justification: This is assumed by networks whose
protocols require a majority of the nodes to behave. In
others, it may hold for economic reasons—deploying as
many nodes as the conforming participants is expensive.
Condition 3. Each receiver set either correctly classifies
at least |LNS |+1 conforming identities as non-Sybil or the
resulting view, when all correctly classified conforming
identities are excluded, is not consistent, i.e., ∀R ∈ 2I :
(|VNS(R) ∩ C| ≥ |LNS | + 1) ∨ (∃Q ∈ 2VNS(R)\C : V (Q) 6=
V (R)). Note that this implies Condition 2.
Justification: This is an extension of Condition 1.
Section 5 quantifies the probability that it holds.
Lemma 4. Under Condition 2 and Condition 3, the largest
subset of I permitting a consistent view is I \ LNS .
Proof: I\LNS permits a consistent view, per Lemma 2.
Let ER , V̂NS(R) ∩ C be the set of correctly classified
conforming nodes for a lying receiver set R, i.e., R∩L 6= ∅.
I\ER is the largest subset possibly permitting a consistent
view under R. By Condition 3, ∀R : |ER| ≥ |LNS |+1.
Theorem 3. Under Condition 2 and Condition 3, the largest
subset of I permitting a consistent view permits just one
consistent view, the true view.
Proof: This follows directly from Lemma 4 and
Theorem 2.
In the next section, we extend the approach to handle
the noise inherent in real-world signalprints.
3.7 Extending Consistency to Handle Noise
Noise prevents true signalprints from always generating
the true view. Observing from prior work that the
misclassifications are bounded (e.g., more than 99%
of Sybils detected with fewer than 5% of conforming
identities collapsed [15], [17]), we extend the notion of
consistency as follows.
Definition. Let γn be the maximum fraction4 of non-Sybil
identities misclassified by a size-n receiver set. Prior work
suggests γ4 = 0.05 is appropriate (for |C| > 20) [15], [17].
Definition. A view is γn-consistent if and only if all size-n
receiver sets that are subsets of the non-Sybil identities
under that view generate a γn-similar view. Two views
4. γn is not the probability that an individual identity is misclassified,
but an upper bound on the total fraction misclassified.
7V 1 and V 2 are γn-similar if and only if( |V 1NS ∩ V 2NS|
|V 1NS \ V 2NS|
>
1− 2γn
γn
)∧( |V 1NS ∩ V 2NS|
|V 2NS \ V 1NS|
>
1− 2γn
γn
)
This statement captures the intuitive notion that V 1NS and
V 2NS should contain the same identities up to differences
expected under the γn bound. A view is γn-true if it is
γn-similar to the true view.
Lemma 5. Under Restriction 1, the view generated by any
truthful receiver set of size n is γn-consistent.5
Proof: Consider two views V 1 and V 2 generated by
conforming receiver sets. Each correctly classifies at least
(1 − γn) of the non-Sybil identities, so |V 1NS ∩ V 2NS| ≥
(1− 2γn)|NS |. Each misclassifies at most γn of the non-
Sybil identities, so |V 1NS \ V 2NS| ≤ γn|NS | and similar for
V 2NS \ V 1NS. The ratio of these bounds is the result.
Substituting γ-consistency for pure consistency, Condi-
tion 3 still holds with high (albeit different) probability,
quantified in Section 5. An analogue of Theorem 3
follows.
Theorem 4. Under Condition 3, the γn-consistent view of
the largest subset of I permitting such a view is γn-true.
In Section 4 we describe an efficient algorithm to
identify the largest subset permitting a γ-consistent view
and thus the correct (up to errors expected due to
signalprint noise) Sybil classification.
4 EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
SELECTION POLICIES
Both the maximum Sybil and view consistency policies
offer ways to select a view, either the one claiming
the most Sybils or the largest one that is γn-true, but
brute-force examination of 2|I| receiver sets is infeasible.
Instead, we describe O(|I|3) algorithms for both policies.
In summary, both start by generating O(|I|) candidate
views (Algorithm 1). For the maximum Sybil policy,
the one claiming the most Sybil identities is trivially
identified. For the view consistency policy, Algorithm 2
is used to identify largest γn-consistent view.
4.1 Candidate Receiver Set Selection
The only requirement for candidate receiver set selection
is that at least one of the candidates must be truthful.
Algorithm 1 selects |I|, size-n (we suggest n = 4) receiver
sets of which at least one is truthful with high probability.
As illustrated in Figure 5, the algorithm starts with all
|I| size-2 receiver sets (lines 2–3) and builds each up to
the full size-n by iteratively (line 4) adding a randomly
selected identity from those indicated to be conforming
at the prior lower dimensionality (line 5). At least |C| of
5. This assumes that the false negative bound is negligible. If it is
not, a similar notion of γ,σ-consistency, where σ is the false negative
bound, can be used. In practice σ is quite small [17], [15], so simple
γn-consistency is fine.
Algorithm 1 Choose the receiver sets to consider
Require: i0 is the identity running the procedure
Require: n is the desired receiver set size
1: S ← ∅
2: for all i ∈ I do
3: R← {i0, i}
4: for cnt = 3→ n do
5: R← R ∪ {RandElement(VNS(R))}
6: end for
7: S ← S ∪ {R}
8: end for
9: return S .with high probability, S contains a
truthful receiver set
Algorithm Progression
R1 7→(i1, i0)
S NS
i3
i5
i6
i2
i4
i8...
...
R|I| 7→(i|I|, i0)
S NS
i1
i3
i5
i2
i4
i6...
...
,
,
,V (R1)
V (R|I|) ,
...
...
7→( i5 , i1, i0)
S NS
i1
i8
i6
i3
i4
i9...
...
7→( i6 , i|I|, i0)
S NS
i1
i3
i5
i2
i4
i7...
...
...
7→( i3 , i5, i1, i0)
S NS
i2
i9
i6
i8
i4
i11...
...
7→( i3 , i6, i|I|, i0)
S NS
i1
i7
i5
i2
i4
i8...
...
...
Fig. 5. Illustration of Algorithm 1. All |I| size-2 receiver
sets are increased to size-4 by iteratively adding a random
identity from those labeled non-Sybil by the current set.
With high probability, at least one of the final sets will
contain only conforming identities.
the initial size-2 receiver sets are conforming and after
increasing to size-n, at least one is still conforming with
high probability (graphed in Figure 6):
1−
(
1−
n−1∏
m=2
(1− γm) · |C| − (m− 1)
|LNS |+ (1− γm) · |C| − (m− 1)
)|C|
The signalprint threshold for this process is chosen
to eliminate (nearly) all false negatives, as having a
few false positives does not matter. The complexity of
a straightforward implementation is O(|I|3). Section 9
further discusses the runtime.
4.2 Finding the Largest γn-Consistent View
Given the |I| candidate receiver sets, the next task is
identifying the one generating a γn-true view, which,
pursuant to Theorem 4, is that permitting the largest
6. For small |C| and relatively large |LNS | the probability can be
increased by building 2 · |I| or 3 · |I| or more receiver sets instead. We
omit further details due to lack of space.
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Algorithm 2 Find receiver set permitting the largest γn-
consistent subset
Require: S is the set of receivers sets generated by Algo-
rithm 1
Require: VNS(R) for each R ∈ {size-2 receiver sets} com-
puted by Algorithm 1
Require: s is the initiator running the algorithm
1: (C,Rmax)← (∞,null)
2: for all R ∈ S do
3: Compute RSSI ratio for each Sybil set in VS(R)
4: c← 0
5: for all i ∈ VNS(R) do
6: e← 0
7: n ← number of identities whose RSSI ratios re-
ported by i do not match that for R
8: if |VNS(R)|+nn <
1−2γn
γn
then
9: e← 1
10: end if
11: if V (R) and V ({i, s}) are not γ2-similar then
12: e← 1
13: end if
14: if e = 1 then
15: c← c+ 1 . exclude i
16: end if
17: end for
18: if c < C then
19: (C,Rmax)← (c,R) . new largest γ-consistent
subset found
20: end if
21: end for
22: return Rmax
subset of I to be γn-consistent. Checking consistency by
examining all 2|VNS| receiver sets is infeasible, so we make
several observations leading to the O(|I|3) Algorithm 2.
For each candidate receiver set (line 2), we determine
how many identities must be excluded for the view to
be γn-consistent (lines 3–17). That excluding the fewest
is γn-true and the desired classification (line 22).
The crux of the algorithm is lines 3–17, which use the
following observations to efficiently determine which
identities must be excluded.
1) Adding an identity to a receiver set can change
the view in one direction only—an identity can go
from Sybil to non-Sybil, but not vice versa—because
uncorrelated RSSI vectors cannot become correlated
by increasing the dimension.7
2) For identities a and b, R∪{a} 7→ V (R) and R∪{b} 7→
V (R) implies R ∪ {a, b} 7→ V (R) because a and b
must have the same RSSI ratios for the Sybils as R.
From these observations, we determine the excluded
identities by computing, for each identity in VS(R), the
RSSI ratio with an arbitrary sibling (line 3) and comparing
against those reported by potential non-Sybils in VNS(R)
(line 7). If the number not matching is too large (line 8),
the view is not γn-consistent and the identity is excluded
(line 15). Further, if the receiver set consisting of just the
supposedly non-Sybil identity and the initiator is not
γ2-similar to R (line 11).
4.3 Runtime in the Absence of Liars
In a typical situation with no liars, the consistency
algorithm can detect the Sybils in O(|I|2) time. Since
all identities are truthful, any chosen receiver set will
be γn-consistent with no exclusions—clearly the largest
possible—and thus the other |I| − 1 also-truthful receiver
sets need not be checked. With lying attackers present,
the overall runtime is O(|I|3), as each algorithm takes
O(|I|3) time.
5 CLASSIFICATION PERFORMANCE AGAINST
OPTIMAL ATTACKERS
Both view selection policies depend directly on the
unpredictability of RSSIs, because collapsing identities
requires knowing the observations of the initiator, as
explained in Section 3.1. An intelligent attacker can
attempt educated guesses, resulting in some successful
collapses. In this section, we evaluate the two selection
policies against optimal attackers, as defined in Section 5.2
and Section 5.3.
5.1 RSSI Unpredictability
Accurate guessing of RSSIs is difficult because the wire-
less channel varies significantly with small displacements
7. This is not true for low dimension receiver sets affected by noise,
but is for the size-(n > 4) sets considered here.
9−40 −20 0 20 40
RSSI
Fig. 7. Distribution of RSSI variations in real-world
deployment.
in location and orientation (spatial variation) and environ-
mental changes over time (temporal variation) [13], [27].
Pre-characterization could account for spatial variation,
but would be prohibitively expensive at the needed
spatial and orientation granularity (6.25 cm [28] and 3◦
for our test devices).
We empirically determined the RSSI variation for
human-carried smartphones by deploying experimental
phones to eleven graduate students in two adjacent offices
and measuring fixed-distance, pairwise RSSIs for fifteen
hours. The observed distribution of deviations8, shown
in Figure 7, is roughly normal with a standard deviation
of 7.3dBm, in line with other real-world measurements
for spatial and orientation variations (4–12dBm and
5.3dBm [13]). We use this distribution to model the
attacker uncertainty of RSSIs.
5.2 Optimal Attacker Strategy—Maximum Sybil Pol-
icy
Theorem 1 shows that the performance of the maxi-
mum Sybil policy is inversely related to the number
of collapsed non-Sybil identities. Therefore, the optimal
attacker tries to collapse as many as possible. We give
two observations about this goal.
1) More distinct guesses increase the probability of
success, so an optimal attacker partitions its (mostly
Sybil) identities, with each group making a different
guess.
2) Smaller group size increases the number of
groups, but decreases the probability the group is
considered—recall that Algorithm 1 generates only
|I| of the possible 2|I| candidate receiver sets.
Consequently, there is an optimal group size that max-
imizes the total number of groups (guesses) outputted
by Algorithm 1, which we obtained via Monte Carlo
simulations. We model the initiator’s RSSI observation
as a random vector whose elements are drawn i.i.d from
the Gaussian distribution in Figure 7. Given the total
number of guesses, the best choices are the vectors with
8. For each pair of transceivers, we subtracted the mean of all their
measurements to get the deviations and aggregated all the pairwise
deviations.
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Condition 3 holds under an optimal attacker strategy with
the attacker’s knowledge of RSSIs modeled as a normal
distribution with standard deviation 7.3dBm.
the highest joint probabilities. The performance against
this strategy is discussed in Section 5.4.
5.3 Optimal Attacker Strategy—View Consistency
Policy
The view consistency policy depends on Condition 3
holding, i.e., all consistent views must correctly classify
at least |LNS |+1 conforming identities. In this section we
quantify the probability that it holds against an optimal
attacker. To break Condition 3, an attacker must generate
a consistent view that collapses at least |C| − |LNS |
conforming identities. We give three observations about
the optimal attacker strategy for this goal.
1) Collapsing |C| − |LNS | identities is easiest with
larger |LNS |. Thus, the optimal attacker uses only
one physical node to claim Sybils—the others just
lie.
2) For a particular false view to be consistent, all
supposedly non-Sybil identities must indict the
same identities, e.g., have the same RSSI guesses
for the collapsed conforming identities. The optimal
attacker must divide its (mostly Sybil) identities into
groups, each using a different set of guesses.
3) More groups increases the probability of success, but
decreases the number of Sybils actually accepted,
as each group is smaller.
We assume the optimal attacker wishes to maximize
the probability of success and thus uses minimum-sized
groups (three identities, for size-4 signalprints).
For each group, the attacker must guess RSSI values
for the conforming identities with the goal of collapsing
at least s , |C|− |LNS | of them. There are (|C|s ) such sets
and the optimal attacker guesses values that maximize the
probability of at least one (across all groups) being correct.
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Fig. 9. The final Sybil ratio, i.e., fraction of accepted
identities that are Sybil, produced by the maximum Sybil
policy against an optimal attacker strategy.
The first group is easy; the |C| guesses are simply the most
likely values, i.e., the expected values for the conforming
identities’ RSSIs, under the uncertainty distribution.
For the next (and subsequent) groups, the optimal
attacker should pick the next most likely RSSI values for
each of the
(|C|
s
)
sets. However, the sets share elements
(only |C| RSSIs are actually guessed), so the attacker must
determine the most probable sets that are compatible.
This is a non-trivial problem, so for our analysis, we
assume that all sets are compatible (e.g., one group can
guess −78dBm and −49dBm RSSIs for nodes a and b,
but −82dBm and −54dBm RSSIs for nodes a and c).
This is clearly impossible, but leads to a conservative
lower bound on the probability that the attacker fails—a
feasible, optimal strategy is less likely to succeed.
Figure 8 shows contours of this lower bound on the
probability that Condition 3 holds as a function of |C|
and |LNS |. When the conforming nodes outnumber the
attacker nodes by at least 1.5×—the expected case in real
networks—the condition holds with very high probability.
In practice, it will hold with even higher probability, as
this is a lower bound.
5.4 Performance Comparison of Both Policies
We compare the performance of the two policies against
the optimal attackers using the final Sybil ratio, the fraction
of accepted identities that are Sybil. Optimal attacker
group sizes are chosen to maximize this metric. We
model the attacker’s knowledge of initiator RSSIs as
a normal distribution with standard deviation 7.3dBm,
which conservatively assumes fine-grained temporal and
spatial characterization (see Section 5.1). We expect real-
world attackers to have less knowledge, leading to even
better classification performance.
Our procedure for generating candidate receiver sets
(Algorithm 1) works best when conforming nodes out-
number physical attackers. This condition should nor-
mally hold in real-world networks (it is the major
motivation for a Sybil attack), so for both policies, we
report results assuming that it does.
Figure 9 graphs the final Sybil ratio of the maximum
Sybil policy, which roughly corresponds to the collapse
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consistency policy against an optimal attacker strategy.
The dashed line corresponds to situations where this policy
performs equally to the maximum Sybil policy for same
numbers of conforming nodes.
ratio |V S∩NS ||C| , a direct measure of the attacker’s collapsing
power. The performance is irrelevant to the number of
physical attackers. The Sybil ratio decreases to 0.05-0.2
when |C| > 10. When |C| < 10, the Sybil ratio is high
(0.2–0.5), despite elimination of most Sybil identities (92%–
99%). This behavior is due to the ease of guessing the
low-dimension RSSI observation vectors.
Figure 10 shows the performance of the consistency
policy. Performance increases rapidly with the ratio
of conforming nodes to physical attackers—recall the
attacker needs to collapse |C|−|LNS | to break Condition 3.
For example, the final Sybil ratio drops below 10−6
when |C||LNS |+1 ≥ 1.6. As the collapse rate is usually
below 0.2 (see Figure 9 when |C| > 10), we observe
good performance when |C| − |LNS | ≥ 0.2|C| (below the
0.05 contour). The dashed line (roughly |C||LNS |+1 =1.2)
indicates the points at which both policies perform
equally. Below it, the consistency policy performs better
than the maximum Sybil policy and above it does worse.
The view consistency policy is superior when conform-
ing nodes are expected to outnumber attacker nodes by
at least 1.2×, the common case in urban environments.
The max Sybil policy remains viable when the number of
physical attackers is comparable to (or even larger than)
that of the conforming nodes. We suggest users of the
Mason test consider their deployment- and application-
specific knowledge when choosing a policy.
6 DETECTING MOBILE ATTACKERS
A mobile attacker can defeat signalprint comparison by
changing locations or orientations between transmissions
to associate distinct signalprints with each Sybil identity.
11
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
0 50 100 150 200
#
of
B
ro
ad
ca
st
s
Pe
rI
de
nt
ity
# of Identities (|I|)
40
0
10
0
10
00
1500
30
0
200
0
20
050 50
0
60
0
70
0
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99th percentile) to precisely switch between two positions
required to defeat the challenge-response moving node
detection.
Fortunately, in the networks we consider, most conform-
ing nodes (e.g., human-carried smartphones and laptops)
are stationary over most short time-spans (1–2min), due
to human mobility habits. Thus, multiple transmissions
should have the same signalprint, as noted, but not
pursued, by Xiao et al. [15]. From this observation, we
develop a protocol to detect moving attackers.
Again, the lack of trusted observations is troublesome.
Instead of comparing signalprints, we compare the initia-
tor’s observations: all transmissions from a conforming
node should have the same RSSI. As shown in Section 8,
this simple criterion yields acceptable detection.
The protocol collection phase (Figure 2a) is extended
to request multiple probe packets (e.g., 14) from each
identity in a pseudo-random order (see Section 7.1). Dur-
ing the classification phase (Figure 2c) each participant
rejects all identities with large RSSI variation across its
transmissions (specifically, a standard deviation larger
than 2.5dBm). In essence, an attacker is challenged to
quickly and precisely switch between the multiple posi-
tions associated with its Sybil identities (6.25 cm location
precision according to coherence length theory [28] and
3◦ orientation precision according to our measurements).
Figure 11 plots the required response time for an
attacker to pass the challenge. Given human reaction
times [29], reliably mounting such an attack would
require specialized hardware—precise electromechanical
control or beam steering antenna arrays—that is outside
our attack model and substantially more expensive to
deploy than compromised commodity devices.
7 THE MASON TEST
This section describes the full Mason test protocol, an im-
plementation of the concepts introduced in the previous
sections. Those results impose four main requirements
on the protocol.
1) Conforming neighbors must be able to participate.
That is, selective jamming of conforming identities
must be detectable.
2) Probe packets must be transmitted in a pseudo-
random order. Further, each participant must be
able to verify that no group of identities controlled
the order.
3) Moving identities are rejected, so to save energy
and time, conforming nodes that are moving when
the protocol begins should not participate.
4) Attackers must not know the RSSI observations of
conforming identities when computing lies.
We assume a known upper bound on the number
of conforming neighbors, i.e., those within the one-hop
transmission range. In most applications, a bound in
the hundreds (we use 400 in our experiments) will be
acceptable. If more identities attempt to participate, the
protocol aborts and no classification is made. This appears
to open a denial-of-service attack. However, we do not
attempt to prevent, instead only detect, DOS attacks,
because one such attack—simply jamming the wireless
channel—is unpreventable (with commodity hardware).
See Section 9 for more discussion.
The rest of this section describes the two components
of the protocol: collection of RSSI observations and Sybil
classification. We assume one identity, the initiator, starts
the protocol and leads the collection, but all identities
still individually and safely perform Sybil classification.
7.1 Collection of RSSI Observations
Phase I: Identity Collection. The first phase gathers
participating neighbors, ensuring that no conforming
identities are jammed by attackers. The initiator sends
a REQUEST message stating its identity, e.g., a public
key. All stationary neighbors respond with their identities
via HELLO-I messages, ACKed by the initiator. Unac-
knowledged HELLO-Is are re-transmitted. The process
terminates when the channel is idle—indicating all
HELLO-I’s were received and ACKed. If the channel
does not go idle before a timeout (e.g., 15 seconds), an
attacker may be selectively jamming some HELLO-Is and
the protocol aborts. The protocol also aborts if too many
identities join, e.g., 400.
Phase II: Randomized Broadcast Request: The second
phase is the challenge-response protocol to collect RSSI
observations for motion detection and Sybil classification.
First, each identity contributes a random value; all are
hashed together to produce a seed to generate the random
sequence of broadcast requests issued by the initiator.
Specifically, it sends a TRANSMIT message to the next
participant in the random sequence, who must quickly
broadcast a signed HELLO-II, e.g., within 10ms in our
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Fig. 12. RSSI correlation as a function of the maximum
device acceleration between observations.
implementation9. Each participant records the RSSIs of
the HELLO-II messages it hears. Some identities will not
hear each other; this is acceptable because the initiator
needs observations from only three other conforming
identities. |I| × s requests are issued, where s is large
enough to ensure a short minimum duration between
consecutive requests for any two pairs of nodes, e.g., 14
in our tests. An identity that fails to respond in time
might be an attacker attempting to change positions and
is rejected.
Phase III: RSSI Observations Report. In the third
phase, the RSSI observations are shared. First, each iden-
tity broadcasts a hash of its observations. Then the actual
values are shared. Those not matching the respective
hash are rejected, preventing attackers from using the
reported values to fabricate plausible observations. The
same mechanism from Phase 1 is used to detect selective
jamming.
7.2 Sybil Classification
Each participant performs Sybil classification individually.
First, the identity verifies that its observations were
not potentially predictable from those reported in prior
rounds, possibly violating Condition 3. Correlation in
RSSI values between observations decreases with motion
between observations, as shown by our experiments (Fig-
ure 12). Thus, a node only performs Sybil classification
if it has strong evidence the current observations are
uncorrelated with prior ones10, i.e., it has observed an
acceleration of at least 2m s−2.
Classification is a simple application of the methods
of Section 6 and Section 4. Each identity with an RSSI
variance across its multiple broadcasts higher than a
threshold is rejected. Then, Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2
are used to identify a γ-true Sybil classification over the
remaining, stationary identities.
9. 10ms is larger than the typical roundtrip time for 802.11b with
packets handled in interrupt context for low-latency responses. These
packets can be signed ahead of time and cached—signatures do not
need to be computed in the 10ms interval.
10. Note that although we did not encounter this case in our
experiments, it is conceivable that some devices will return to the
same location and orientation after motion.
TABLE 2
Thresholds for Signalprint Comparison and Motion
Filtering
Name Threshold (dBm)
Signalprint Distance dimension-2 0.85
dimension-3 3.6
dimension-4 1.2
RSSI Standard Deviation 2.5
TABLE 3
Classification Performance
Environment Sensitivity (%) Specificity (%)
Office I 99.6 96.5
Office II 100.0 87.7
Cafeteria 91.4 86.6
Outdoor 95.9 61.1
8 PROTOTYPE AND EVALUATION
We implemented the Mason test as a Linux kernel module
and tested its performance on HTC Magic Android
smartphones in various operating environments. It sits
directly above the 802.11 link layer, responding to re-
quests in interrupt context, to minimize response latency
for the REQUEST–HELLO-II sequence (12ms roundtrip
time on our hardware). The classification algorithms are
implemented in Python.
Wireless channels are environment-dependent, so we
evaluated the Mason test in four different environments.
Office I Eleven participants in two adjacent offices for
fifteen hours.
Office II Eleven participants in two adjacent offices in a
different building for one hour, to determine whether
performance varies across similar, but non-identical
environments.
Cafeteria Eleven participants in a crowded cafeteria
during lunch. This was a rapidly-changing wireless
environment due to frequent motion of the cafeteria
patrons.
Outdoor Eleven participants meeting in a cold, open,
grassy courtyard for one hour, capturing the outdoor
environment. Participants moved frequently to stay
warm.
In each environment, we conducted multiple trials with
one Sybil attacker11 generating 4, 20, 40, and 160 Sybil
identities. The gathered traces were split into testing and
training sets.
8.1 Selection and Robustness of Thresholds
The training data were used to determine good motion
filter and signalprint distance thresholds, shown in
Table 2.
11. As discussed in Section 3 and Section 5, additional physical nodes
are best used as lying, non-Sybils.
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Fig. 13. ROC curve showing the classification perfor-
mance of signalprint comparison in different environments
for varying distance thresholds. Only identities that passed
the motion filter are considered. The knees of the curves
all correspond to the same thresholds, suggesting that the
same value can be used in all locations.
The motion filter threshold was chosen such that at
least 95% of the conforming participants (averaged over
all training rounds) in the low-motion Office I environ-
ment would pass. This policy ensures that conforming
smartphones, which are usually left mostly stationary, e.g.,
on desks, in purses, or in the pockets of seated people,
will usually pass the test. Devices exhibiting more motion
(i.e., a standard deviation of RSSIs at the initiator larger
than 2.5dBm)—as would be expected from an attacker
trying to defeat signalprint detection—will be rejected.
The signalprint distance thresholds were chosen by
evaluating the signalprint classification performance at
various possible values. Figure 13 shows the ROC curves
for size-4 receiver sets (a “positive” is an identity classi-
fied as Sybil). Note that the true positive and false positive
rates consider only identities that passed the motion
filter, in order to isolate the effects of the signalprint
distance threshold. The curves show that a good threshold
has performance in line with prior work [15], [17], as
expected.
In all environments, the knees of the curve correspond
to the same thresholds, suggesting that these values
can be used in general, across environments. A possible
explanation is that despite environment differences, the
signalprint distance distributions for stationary Sybil
siblings are identical. All results in this paper use these
uniform thresholds, show in Table 2.
8.2 Classification Performance
The performance of the full Mason test—motion filtering
and signalprint comparison—is detailed by the confusion
matrices in Figure 14. Many tests were conducted in
each environment, so average percentages are shown
instead of absolute counts. To evaluate the performance,
we consider two standard classification metrics derived
from these matrices, sensitivity (percentage of Sybil iden-
tities correctly identified) and specificity (percentage of
conforming identities correctly identified).
Note that 100% sensitivity is not necessary. Most
protocols that would use Mason require a majority of
the participants to be conforming. The total identities
are limited (e.g., 400) so rejecting most of the Sybils and
accepting most of the conforming identities is sufficient
to meet this requirement.
Table 3 shows the performance for all four environ-
ments. The test performs best in the low-motion indoor
environments, with over 99.5% sensitivity and over 85%
specificity. The sensitivity in the cafeteria environment is
just 91.4%, likely due to the rapid and frequent changes
in the wireless environment resulting from the movement
of cafeteria patrons. In the outdoor environment, with
participants moving, the specificity is 61.1% because some
conforming identities are rejected by the motion filter12.
An identity is classified as Sybil for three reasons: if
it has similar signalprints with another, the initiator has
too few RSSI reports to form a signalprint, or it fails
the motion filter. Figure 15 shows the relative prevalence
of these causes of the false positives. Interestingly, the
first cause—collapsing—is rare, occurring only in the first
office environment. Not surprisingly, missing RSSI reports
are an issue only in the environments with significant
obstructions, the indoor offices, accounting for about half
of these false positives. In the open cafeteria and outdoor
environments, all false positives are due to participant
motion.
8.3 Overhead Evaluation
Figure 16 shows the runtime and energy overhead for
the Mason test collection phase, with the stacked bars
separating the costs by sub-phase. For a protocol not
run frequently (once every hour is often sufficient),
the runtimes of 10–90 seconds are acceptable. Likewise,
smartphone energy consumption is acceptable, with the
extreme 18 J consumption for 400 identities representing
0.01% of the 17.500 J capacity of a typical smartphone
batteries.
Figure 17 show the classification phase overheads for
2–100 identities. At a small fraction of the collection
costs, these are also acceptable. For more than 100
participants, costs become excessive due to the O(n3)
scaling behavior13. Limiting participation to 100 identities
may be necessary for energy-constrained devices, but will
generally not reduce performance because having 100
non-Sybil, one-hop neighbors is rare.
The periodic accelerometer sampling used to measure
motion between Mason test rounds consumes 5.2% of
battery capacity over a typical 18h work day.
12. These moving participants normally do not participate. Including
them here makes clears that they are not identified as conforming.
13. A native-C implementation might scale to 300–400 identities.
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Fig. 14. Confusion matrices detailing the classifier performance in the four environments. S is Sybil and C is conforming.
Multiple tests were run in each environment, so mean percentages are shown instead of absolute counts.
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9 DISCUSSION
Sybil classification from untrusted observations is difficult
and the Mason test is not a silver bullet. Not requiring
trusted observations is a significant improvement, but
the test’s limitations must be carefully considered before
deployment. As with any system intended for real-world
use, some decisions try to balance system complexity and
potential security weaknesses. In this section, we discuss
these trade-offs, limitations, and related concerns.
High Computation Time: The collection phase time is
governed by the 802.11b-induced 12ms per packet latency
and the classification runtime grows quickly, O(|I|3).
Although typically fast (e.g., <5 s for 5–10 nodes), the
Mason test is slower in high density areas (e.g., 40 s for
100 nodes). However, it should be run infrequently, e.g.,
once or twice per hour. Topologies change slowly (most
people change locations infrequently) and many protocols
requiring Sybil resistance can handle the lag—they need
only know a subset of the current non-Sybil neighbors.
Easy Denial-of-Service Attack: An attacker can force
the protocol to abort by creating many identities or
jamming transmissions from the conforming identities.
We cannot on commodity 802.11 devices solve another
denial-of-service attack—simply jamming the channel—
so defending against these more-complicated variants is
ultimately useless. Most locations will at most times be
free of such attackers—the Mason test provides a way
to verify this condition, reject any Sybils, and let other
protocols operate knowing they are Sybil-free.
Requires Several Conforming Neighbors: The Mason
test requires true RSSI observations from some neighbors
(i.e., 3) and is easily defeated otherwise. Although beyond
the page limits of this paper, protocols incorporating the
Mason test can mitigate this risk by (a) a priori estimation
of the distribution of the number of conforming neighbors
and (b) careful composition of results from multiple
rounds to bound the failure probability.
Limit On Total Identities: This limit (e.g., 400) is un-
fortunately necessary to detect when conforming nodes
are being selectively jammed while keeping the test
duration short enough that most conforming nodes
remain stationary. We believe that most wireless networks
have typical node degrees well below 400 anyway.
Messages Must Be Signed: Packets sent during the
collection phase are signed, which can be very slow with
public key schemes. However, this is easily mitigated
by (a) pre-signing the packets to keep the delay off the
critical path or (b) using faster secret-key-based schemes.
Details are again omitted due to page constraints.
Pre-Characterization Reveals RSSIs: An attacker could
theoretically improve its collapsing probability by pre-
characterizing the wireless environment. We believe
such attacks are impractical because the required spatial
granularity is about 6.25 cm, the device orientation is
still unknown, and environmental changes (e.g., people
moving) reduces the usefulness of prior characterization.
Prior Rounds Reveal RSSI Information: The protocol
defends against this. Conforming nodes do not perform
classification if their RSSI observations are correlated with
the prior rounds (see Section 7.2).
High False Positive Rates: With the motion filter, the
false positive rate can be high, e.g., 20% of conforming
identities rejected in some environments. We believe
this is acceptable because most protocols requiring Sybil
resistance need only a subset of honest identities. For
example, if for reliability some data is to be spread among
multiple neighbors, it is acceptable to spread it among a
subset chosen from 80%, rather than all, of the non-Sybils.
10 CONCLUSION
We have described a method to use signalprints to detect
Sybil attacks in open ad hoc and delay-tolerant networks
without requiring trust in any other node or authority.
We use the inherent difficulty of predicting RSSIs to
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Fig. 16. Overhead of the collection phase. The stacked bars partition the cost
among the participant collection (HELLO I), RSSI measurement (HELLO II),
and RSSI observation exchange (RSST) steps.
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sumption of the classification phase.
separate true and false RSSI observations reported by
one-hop neighbors. Attackers using motion to defeat
the signalprint technique are detected by requiring low-
latency retransmissions from the same position.
The Mason test was implemented on HTC Magic
smartphones and tested with human participants in
three environments. It eliminates 99.6%–100% of Sybil
identities in office environments, 91% in a crowded high-
motion cafeteria, and 96% in a high-motion open outdoor
environment. It accepts 88%–97% of conforming identities
in the office environments, 87% in the cafeteria, and 61%
in the outdoor environment. The vast majority of rejected
conforming identities were eliminated due to motion.
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